caa a22 4500 467920613 CHVBK 20180406152916.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11245-006-0006-1 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11245-006-0006-1 Dreyfus Hubert University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA aut Overcoming the myth of the mental [Elektronische Daten] [Hubert Dreyfus] Can we accept John McDowell's Kantian claim that perception is conceptual "all the way out,” thereby denying the more basic perceptual capacities we seem to share with prelinguistic infants and higher animals? More generally, can philosophers successfully describe the conceptual upper floors of the edifice of knowledge while ignoring the embodied coping going on on the ground floor? I argue that we shouldn't leave the conceptual component of our lives hanging in midair and suggest how philosophers who want to understand knowledge and action can profit from a phenomenological analysis of the nonconceptual embodied coping skills we share with animals and infants, as well as the nonconceptual immediate intuitive understanding exhibited by experts. Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2006 myth of the given nationallicence myth of the mental nationallicence phenomenology nationallicence expertise nationallicence skill nationallicence perception nationallicence action nationallicence Topoi Kluwer Academic Publishers 25/1-2(2006-09-01), 43-49 0167-7411 25:1-2<43 2006 25 11245 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-006-0006-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-006-0006-1 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Dreyfus Hubert University of California-Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topoi Kluwer Academic Publishers 25/1-2(2006-09-01), 43-49 0167-7411 25:1-2<43 2006 25 11245 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer