caa a22 4500 467921091 CHVBK 20180406152917.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060401xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10818-006-0004-9 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10818-006-0004-9 Mindreading and Manipulation in an Ecology of Prisoner's Dilemma Games: Laboratory Experiments [Elektronische Daten] [Mikhail Myagkov, John Orbell] Synopsis: Humans have a rational reason to seek out and selectively play Prisoner's Dilemma games with others who (for whatever reason) will play cooperatively, while avoiding those who will defect. It follows that they also have reason to try and persuade others that they will personally cooperate if a game is joined (using the term from Evolutionary Psychology, to ‘manipulate' others' beliefs) and, thus, to penetrate to the truth underlying such efforts (to ‘mindread' others intentions). We develop an economic model of mindreading and manipulation that can govern exchange relationships in natural circumstances, and report laboratory data showing that, absent constraining institutions that make play with cooperators likely, intending defectors are more likely to be chosen as partners than are intending cooperators. Intending defectors' efforts at manipulation appear to be more successful than their potential victims' efforts at mindreading. The findings suggest the nature of the problem that must be addressed for would-be traders in the absence of well-enforced rules governing contracts, and we discuss the patterns of behavior that are likely responses in such circumstances. Springer, 2006 cheating nationallicence cheater-recognition nationallicence exchange nationallicence C91 nationallicence Myagkov Mikhail Department of Political Science, University of Oregon Eugene, 97403, OR, USA aut Orbell John Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences & Political Science Department, University of Oregon, 97403, Eugene, OR, USA aut Journal of Bioeconomics Kluwer Academic Publishers 8/1(2006-04-01), 67-83 1387-6996 8:1<67 2006 8 10818 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-006-0004-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-006-0004-9 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Myagkov Mikhail Department of Political Science, University of Oregon Eugene, 97403, OR, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Orbell John Institute of Cognitive and Decision Sciences & Political Science Department, University of Oregon, 97403, Eugene, OR, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Bioeconomics Kluwer Academic Publishers 8/1(2006-04-01), 67-83 1387-6996 8:1<67 2006 8 10818 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer