caa a22 4500 467921229 CHVBK 20180406152917.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s10818-006-9001-2 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s10818-006-9001-2 Information Structure and the Tragedy of the Commons in Resource Extraction [Elektronische Daten] [Rabah Amir, Niels Nannerup] Synopsis: This paper considers the well-known Levhari-Mirman discrete-time model of resource extraction, and investigates the effects of the information structure of the dynamic game - open-loop, Markovian or history-dependent - on the equilibrium consumption path and the overall utility of the agents. Due to the special structure of the model, the open-loop regime yields a Pareto-optimal outcome. The Markovian regime leads to the most pronounced version of the tragedy of the commons. History-dependent behavior yields an outcome set that is intermediate between the other two cases, and that may include the Pareto-optimal outcome in some cases. The level of efficiency of equilibrium behaviour is thus U-shaped as a function of the level of information the agents' extraction strategies are based on. The analysis suggests that in environments characterized by a dynamic (and no market) externality, forcing agents to commit to open-loop behavior would constitute welfare-improving regulation. Springer, 2006 dynamic resource games nationallicence open and closed loop strategies nationallicence trigger strategies nationallicence Pareto optimality nationallicence regulation nationallicence Amir Rabah CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium aut Nannerup Niels Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 5230, Odense M, Denmark aut Journal of Bioeconomics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 8/2(2006-08-01), 147-165 1387-6996 8:2<147 2006 8 10818 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-006-9001-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s10818-006-9001-2 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Amir Rabah CORE, University of Louvain, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, 1348, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Nannerup Niels Department of Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 5230, Odense M, Denmark aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Bioeconomics Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 8/2(2006-08-01), 147-165 1387-6996 8:2<147 2006 8 10818 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer