caa a22 4500 467928371 CHVBK 20180406152936.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11158-006-9007-6 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11158-006-9007-6 Couto Alexandra Lincoln College, University of Oxford, Turl Street, OX1 3DR, Oxford, UK aut Privacy and Justification* [Elektronische Daten] [Alexandra Couto] In this paper, I aim to demonstrate the importance of liberal engagement in public debate, in the face of Nagel's claim that respect for privacy requires liberals to withdraw from their ‘control of the culture'. The paper starts by outlining a pluralist conception of privacy. I then proceed to examine whether there really is liberal cultural control, as Nagel affirms it, and whether such control truly involves a violation of privacy. Moreover, I argue that Nagel's desire to leave the social and cultural space radically neutral is incompatible with Rawls' conception of public reason and clashes with the need to justify liberal institutions. Springer Science+Business Media, Inc., 2006 cultural control nationallicence cultural war nationallicence freedom of thought and expression nationallicence justification of the basic structure nationallicence liberal institutions nationallicence privacy nationallicence public reason nationallicence social sanction nationallicence Res Publica Kluwer Academic Publishers 12/3(2006-09-01), 223-248 1356-4765 12:3<223 2006 12 11158 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9007-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11158-006-9007-6 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Couto Alexandra Lincoln College, University of Oxford, Turl Street, OX1 3DR, Oxford, UK aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Res Publica Kluwer Academic Publishers 12/3(2006-09-01), 223-248 1356-4765 12:3<223 2006 12 11158 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer