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   <subfield code="a">The Effects of Taxes and Advertising Restrictions on the Market Structure of the U.S. Cigarette Market</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">A dynamic oligopoly model of the cigarette industry is developed to study the effects of anti-smoking policies on the market structure of the U.S. cigarette industry. Firms are modeled as competing in price and advertising in a dynamic game. Two commonly used anti-smoking policies - advertising restrictions and tobacco tax increases - are evaluated using calibrated parameters. The simulation results show that in the long run both advertising restrictions and tax increases can successfully reduce the smoking rate. However, advertising restrictions reduce the smoking rate mainly in an indirect way through their impact on the concentration of the market, while tax increases reduce the smoking rate directly and have little effect on the concentration of the market. In addition, in the short run, advertising restrictions have a much smaller effect on reducing the smoking rate than tax increases.</subfield>
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