caa a22 4500 467930082 CHVBK 20180406152941.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11151-006-9103-y doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11151-006-9103-y Hassle Costs, Price-Matching Guarantees and Price Competition: An Experiment [Elektronische Daten] [Subhasish Dugar, Todd Sorensen] We experimentally investigate whether the collusion-facilitating nature of price-matching guarantees survives the introduction of hassle costs incurred by buyers to enforce these guarantees. The presence of an arbitrarily small number of positive hassle costs buyers may completely undermine incentives for collusion. To evaluate this possibility, we develop four one-shot price competition models that test the hassle cost argument by varying proportions of positive and zero hassle cost buyers present in the market. Although the theory predicts that the competitive price should emerge in equilibrium in all four models, we experimentally find significant price differences. Springer, 2006 Experiment nationallicence hassle costs nationallicence price-matching guarantees nationallicence Dugar Subhasish Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut Sorensen Todd Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 28/4(2006-06-01), 359-378 0889-938X 28:4<359 2006 28 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9103-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9103-y text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dugar Subhasish Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sorensen Todd Department of Economics, University of Arizona, 85721, Tucson, AZ, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 28/4(2006-06-01), 359-378 0889-938X 28:4<359 2006 28 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer