caa a22 4500 467930155 CHVBK 20180406152941.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x Iimi Atsushi Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) Institute, and International Monetary Fund, African Department, 700 19th Street, 20431, N.W. Washington, DC, USA aut Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance [Elektronische Daten] [Atsushi Iimi] Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements. Springer, 2006 competition effects nationallicence official development assistance nationallicence procurement auctions nationallicence Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 28/2(2006-03-01), 109-128 0889-938X 28:2<109 2006 28 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-0012-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Iimi Atsushi Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) Institute, and International Monetary Fund, African Department, 700 19th Street, 20431, N.W. Washington, DC, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 28/2(2006-03-01), 109-128 0889-938X 28:2<109 2006 28 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer