caa a22 4500 467930333 CHVBK 20180406152941.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e20060901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s11151-006-9112-x doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s11151-006-9112-x Kwoka John Department of Economics, Northeastern University, 301 Lake Hall, 02115, Boston, MA, USA aut The Role of Competition in Natural Monopoly: Costs, Public Ownership, and Regulation [Elektronische Daten] [John Kwoka] Conventional policy for industries with very high economies of scale is to permit monopoly but to subject it to regulation or public ownership. Since the latter may not result in cost minimization, however, it is possible that competition, by forcing firms to operate at the cost frontier, may be less costly despite sacrificing some scale economies. The paper sets out the relevant analytical considerations, estimates a cost function for electric distribution utilities in the U.S., and tests for the relative costs of monopoly and duopoly utilities. Among other notable findings, it concludes that competition does indeed lower net costs. Springer, 2006 Benchmark competition nationallicence electric utilities nationallicence public ownership nationallicence regulation nationallicence Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 29/1-2(2006-09-01), 127-147 0889-938X 29:1-2<127 2006 29 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9112-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-006-9112-x text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kwoka John Department of Economics, Northeastern University, 301 Lake Hall, 02115, Boston, MA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers-Plenum Publishers; http://www.springer-ny.com 29/1-2(2006-09-01), 127-147 0889-938X 29:1-2<127 2006 29 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer