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   <subfield code="a">Cohabitation or forced marriage? A study of the costs of failing to coordinate fiscal and monetary policies</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Andrew Hallett, Maria Petit]</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Conclusions: The costs of uncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies involve more than just efficiency losses. Of course there will be the usual efficiency losses associated with noncooperative decision making and they have appeared here. But these are not the main costs. A lack of cooperation between the government and the central bank also imposes a policy conflict which would not otherwise exist. A lack of co-operation provides one player (the central bank) with the opportunity to block the policy options of the other (the government). Hence noncooperation can cost the government its freedom to choose its preferred policy option. These two costs, additional policy conflicts and the loss of policy choice, may be more important than the efficiency losses which are traditionally cited as the reason for cooperating. In any case, they will have important implications both for domestic policy design and for international policy making since central banks evidently find it easier to cooperate among themselves than they do with their own (national) fiscal authorities. Thus, an independent central bank may be necessary to guarantee financial discipline, but it will not be much help if it and the fiscal authorities then fail to coordinate their activities.</subfield>
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