caa a22 4500 467994242 CHVBK 20180323112553.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19900601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00389670 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00389670 Innovation, rent-sharing and the organization of labour in the federal republic of Germany [Elektronische Daten] [Felix FitzRoy, Kornelius Kraft] Rent seeking by unions may inhibit various kinds of investment, particularly R&D, and unionization is often negatively related to innovation across industries. Formal organization and collective bargaining may also reduce the flexibility of work organization, and hence inhibit innovation. In a sample of small- and medium-sized firms in the FRG metal-working industry, a measure of organized labour was negatively related to product innovation, but there was little evidence for rent-seeking in simultaneous estimates. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990 FitzRoy Felix Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-1000, Berlin 30, West Germany aut Kraft Kornelius Universität Kassel, West Germany aut Small Business Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 2/2(1990-06-01), 95-103 0921-898X 2:2<95 1990 2 11187 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00389670 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00389670 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- FitzRoy Felix Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung, Reichpietschufer 50, D-1000, Berlin 30, West Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Kraft Kornelius Universität Kassel, West Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Small Business Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 2/2(1990-06-01), 95-103 0921-898X 2:2<95 1990 2 11187 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer