caa a22 4500 46903940X CHVBK 20180323132807.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00768299 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00768299 Ramsey William University of Notre Dame, Australia aut Prototypes and conceptual analysis [Elektronische Daten] [William Ramsey] In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Topoi Springer Netherlands 11/1(1992-03-01), 59-70 0167-7411 11:1<59 1992 11 11245 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00768299 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00768299 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ramsey William University of Notre Dame, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Topoi Springer Netherlands 11/1(1992-03-01), 59-70 0167-7411 11:1<59 1992 11 11245 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer