caa a22 4500 469042605 CHVBK 20180323132815.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00353403 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00353403 Ross Thomas Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, V6T IZ2, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada aut On the vertical integration of successive monopolies [Elektronische Daten] [Thomas Ross] This essay studies the private incentives for, and welfare consequences of, the vertical integration of successive monopolies. When the merged firm is as efficient as its pre-merger components, private and social interests coincide and the merger raises welfare by eliminating the double mark-up. When the merger leads to higher costs it is possible that some mergers will be privately profitable but not socially desirable and that some will be socially desirable but not privately profitable. These results suggest that a laissez-faire approach to this type of merger by antitrust authorities will not always be appropriate. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Mergers nationallicence successive monopoly nationallicence vertical integration nationallicence Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/3-4(1992-09-01), 375-383 0889-938X 7:3-4<375 1992 7 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353403 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353403 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ross Thomas Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration, University of British Columbia, V6T IZ2, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/3-4(1992-09-01), 375-383 0889-938X 7:3-4<375 1992 7 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer