caa a22 4500 469042680 CHVBK 20180323132815.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00353398 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00353398 Flamm Kenneth The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., 20036, Washington, D.C., U.S.A. aut Strategic arguments for semiconductor trade policy [Elektronische Daten] [Kenneth Flamm] If foreign firms supplying inputs to domestic user industries enjoy significant monopoly power, domestic subsidies intended to reduce monopoly rent extraction may be desirable. This argument is evaluated in the case of U.S. production of 1-megabit DRAM chips. I develop a two-stage model of a high-technology industry in which both learning and scale economies, and capacity constraints are important. My simulations display more realistic outcomes than earlier attempts to model semiconductor production. Precise specification of learning economies is crucial; consumer welfare losses due to successful cartelization are potentially large, greatly exceeding the monopoly rents created. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Semiconductor industry nationallicence strategic trade policy nationallicence learning economies nationallicence cartel nationallicence U.S.-Japan competition nationallicence Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/3-4(1992-09-01), 295-325 0889-938X 7:3-4<295 1992 7 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353398 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00353398 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Flamm Kenneth The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., 20036, Washington, D.C., U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/3-4(1992-09-01), 295-325 0889-938X 7:3-4<295 1992 7 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer