caa a22 4500 469042788 CHVBK 20180323132816.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00354847 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00354847 Rose David Department of Economics, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road, 63121, St. Louis, MO, U.S.A. aut Bankruptcy risk, firm-specific managerial human capital, and diversification [Elektronische Daten] [David Rose] This paper proposes a model in which firm diversification acts as an efficient form of nonpecuniary compensation for the manager. In the model diversification rewards the manager by reducing the likelihood of bankruptcy which in turn increases the expected value of his firm-specific human capital. Unlike the principal-agent model of diversification, this model shows that diversification may be optimal even if the manager is risk neutral and his behavior can be observed by firm owners. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Diversification nationallicence bankruptcy nationallicence Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/1(1992-03-01), 65-73 0889-938X 7:1<65 1992 7 11151 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354847 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00354847 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Rose David Department of Economics, University of Missouri-St. Louis, 8001 Natural Bridge Road, 63121, St. Louis, MO, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Review of Industrial Organization Kluwer Academic Publishers 7/1(1992-03-01), 65-73 0889-938X 7:1<65 1992 7 11151 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer