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   <subfield code="a">Mergers that harm competitors</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Standard models of oligopolistic interdependence predict that firms remaining outside of a horizontal merger will benefit from it. Why, then, do nonparticipating firms feel threatened by mergers? This paper shows that under reasonable conditions a non-participating firm is harmed by a merger. The analysis is based on a spatial equilibrium with suppliers and demanders located at fixed points. Mergers harm non-participating firms as a result of the decrease in the level of marginal costs of the merged firm attributable to decreased output in markets where competition is eliminated. This lowered marginal cost makes the merged firm a more formidable competitor in markets in which outsiders participate. This effect is in almost all cases sufficient to make outsiders worse off after a merger. Simulations on a sample of spatial equilibria show that the harm to outsiders is a reliable index of the harm that the merger causes to social welfare.</subfield>
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