caa a22 4500 469075848 CHVBK 20180323132934.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00133624 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00133624 Morris John Department of Business Economics School of Business, Federal Trade Commission and Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN, USA aut Upstream vertical integration with automatic price adjustments [Elektronische Daten] [John Morris] Regulators often must decide whether they should allow a utility to vertically integrate. The relevant policy concerns are whether vertical integration might allow the utility to increase its downstream price and what, if any, additional constraints must be placed on the utility to prevent potential price increases. The extant literature provides regulators little guidance, and this paper fills the void by providing an analysis of the effects of upstream vertical integration by a regulated firm. The paper considers integration into the production of an intermediate input for which the price is automatically passed through to downstream customers. It demonstrates that vertical integration can result in higher downstream prices and greater profit for the utility whenever regulators imperfectly monitor input prices. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/3(1992-09-01), 279-287 0922-680X 4:3<279 1992 4 11149 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133624 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00133624 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Morris John Department of Business Economics School of Business, Federal Trade Commission and Indiana University, 47405, Bloomington, IN, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/3(1992-09-01), 279-287 0922-680X 4:3<279 1992 4 11149 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer