caa a22 4500 469075929 CHVBK 20180323132935.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19921201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00134926 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00134926 Risa Alf Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Jonas Reinsgt. 19, N-5008, Bergen, Norway aut Public regulation of private accident risk: The moral hazard of technological improvements [Elektronische Daten] [Alf Risa] This paper discusses individual agents' incentives to take precautions to prevent accidents when the prevention technology facing the agents is changed due to regulation. It is shown that private prevention activities vary greatly with different attitudes towards risk. This is a great potential problem for the implementation of several types of legal regulation of individuals' precautionary level, like negligence rules. In this case, regulators need to observe the true preferences of the regulated agents to implement the optimal program. One novel feature of the present analysis is that only simple properties of the prevention technology need to be known to identify potential incentive problems, regardless of the underlying preferences. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/4(1992-12-01), 335-346 0922-680X 4:4<335 1992 4 11149 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134926 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134926 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Risa Alf Department of Economics, University of Bergen, Jonas Reinsgt. 19, N-5008, Bergen, Norway aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/4(1992-12-01), 335-346 0922-680X 4:4<335 1992 4 11149 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer