caa a22 4500 469075937 CHVBK 20180323132935.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19921201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00134924 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00134924 Spulber Daniel Northwestern University J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Leverone Hall, 60208-2001, Evanston, IL, USA aut Capacity-contingent nonlinear pricing by regulated firms [Elektronische Daten] [Daniel Spulber] Second-best Pareto optimal pricing by a regulated firm subject to demand and capacity shocks is examined. Nonlinear price schedules for the firm's customers are obtained that are contingent on capacity realizations. The second-best Pareto optimal mechanism also is implemented by an allocation mechanism based on the consumer's choice of a minimum demand or firm power level. The optimal mechanism is implemented as well by a general form of priority pricing. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/4(1992-12-01), 299-319 0922-680X 4:4<299 1992 4 11149 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134924 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00134924 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Spulber Daniel Northwestern University J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Leverone Hall, 60208-2001, Evanston, IL, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Regulatory Economics Kluwer Academic Publishers 4/4(1992-12-01), 299-319 0922-680X 4:4<299 1992 4 11149 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer