caa a22 4500 469102489 CHVBK 20180323133047.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170328e19920801xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF00373695 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF00373695 Kronz Frederick Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, 78712-1180, Austin, Texas, USA aut Carnap and Achinstein on evidence [Elektronische Daten] [Frederick Kronz] Two notions of evidence are focused on in this essay, Carnap's positive-relevance notion of evidence (1962, pp. 462 ff.), and Achinstein's notion of potential evidence (1978; and 1983, pp. 322-350). Achinstein creates several interesting examples in his attempt to find faults in Carnap's notion of evidence; his motive, ultimately, is to impel us towards potential evidence. The purpose of this essay is to show that positive relevance is significantly more promising than potential evidence with respect to capturing the scientific sense of the term "evidence.” This is accomplished by finding faults in the notion of potential evidence, and by defending positive relevance against Achinstein's examples. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992 Philosophical Studies Kluwer Academic Publishers 67/2(1992-08-01), 151-167 0031-8116 67:2<151 1992 67 11098 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00373695 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00373695 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Kronz Frederick Department of Philosophy, The University of Texas at Austin, 78712-1180, Austin, Texas, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Philosophical Studies Kluwer Academic Publishers 67/2(1992-08-01), 151-167 0031-8116 67:2<151 1992 67 11098 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer