caa a22 4500 475739493 CHVBK 20180406123455.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s100580050045 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s100580050045 Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment [Elektronische Daten] [Georges Dionne, Claude Fluet] Abstract.: This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 JEL classification:D82, H57 nationallicence Key words:Incentives, multi-period contracts, regulation, procurement, renegotiation proofness, asymmetric information, full pooling nationallicence Dionne Georges HEC-Montréal, 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Canada H3T 2A7 (e-mail: dionne@crt.umontreal.ca), CA aut Fluet Claude Université du Québec à Montréal, CP 8888 succ. Centre Ville, Montréal, Canada H3C 3P8 (e-mail: fluet.claude-denys@ugam.ca), CA aut https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050045 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050045 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dionne Georges HEC-Montréal, 3000, Chemin de la Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Canada H3T 2A7 (e-mail: dionne@crt.umontreal.ca), CA aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Fluet Claude Université du Québec à Montréal, CP 8888 succ. Centre Ville, Montréal, Canada H3C 3P8 (e-mail: fluet.claude-denys@ugam.ca), CA aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer