caa a22 4500 475739523 CHVBK 20180406123456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s100580050047 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s100580050047 Menicucci Domenico Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata alle Scienze Umane, Università degli Studi di Torino, 10122 Torino, Italy (e-mail: menicucci@econ.unito.it), IT aut On efficient trading mechanisms between one seller and n buyers [Elektronische Daten] [Domenico Menicucci] Abstract.: Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) prove that if one seller and one buyer have independent private valuations for an indivisible object then no individually rational and incentive compatible trading mechanism can guarantee ex post efficiency when gains from trade are uncertain. Makowski and Mezzetti (1993) show that this is not the case when there are at least two buyers. In the latter context, if the highest possible seller's valuation is not too large, we provide an ex post efficient mechanism in which the mechanism designer and the agents are not required to know the probability distribution for the seller's valuation. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 JEL classification:D70, D82, C72 nationallicence Key words:Incomplete information, mechanism design, efficient mechanisms, first price auctions nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050047 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050047 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Menicucci Domenico Dipartimento di Statistica e Matematica Applicata alle Scienze Umane, Università degli Studi di Torino, 10122 Torino, Italy (e-mail: menicucci@econ.unito.it), IT aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer