caa a22 4500 475739604 CHVBK 20180406123456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/PL00013689 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/PL00013689 Network formation with sequential demands [Elektronische Daten] [Sergio Currarini, Massimo Morelli] Abstract.: This paper introduces a non-cooperative game-theoretic model of sequential network formation, in which players propose links and demand payoffs. Payoff division is therefore endogenous. We show that if the value of networks satisfies size monotonicity, then each and every equilibrium network is efficient. The result holds not only when players make absolute participation demands, but also when they are allowed to make link-specific demands. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 JEL classification: C7 nationallicence Key words: Link formation, efficient networks, payoff division nationallicence Currarini Sergio Department of Economics, University of Venice, Cannaregio N 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy (e-mail: s.currarini@rhbnc.ac.uk), IT aut Morelli Massimo Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 425 ARPS Hall, 1945 North High Street,Columbus, OH 43210, USA (e-mail: morelli@economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu), US aut https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013689 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00013689 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Currarini Sergio Department of Economics, University of Venice, Cannaregio N 873, 30121 Venezia, Italy (e-mail: s.currarini@rhbnc.ac.uk), IT aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Morelli Massimo Department of Economics, Ohio State University, 425 ARPS Hall, 1945 North High Street,Columbus, OH 43210, USA (e-mail: morelli@economics.sbs.ohio-state.edu), US aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer