caa a22 4500 475739647 CHVBK 20180406123456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s100580000015 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s100580000015 Incentive compatible reward schemes for labour-managed firms [Elektronische Daten] [Salvador Barberà, Bhaskar Dutta] Abstract.: We consider a simple case of team production, where a set of workers have to contribute a single input (say labour) and then share the joint output amongst themselves. Different incentive issues arise when the skills as well as the levels of effort expended by workers are not publicly observable. We study one of these issues in terms of a very simple model in which two types of workers, skilled and unskilled, supply effort inelastically. Thus, we assume away the problem of moral hazard in order to focus on that of adverse selection. We also consider a hierarchical structure of production in which the workers need to be organised in two tiers. We look for reward schemes which specify higher payments to workers who have been assigned to the top-level jobs when the principal detects no lies, distribute the entire output in all circumstances, and induce workers to revel their true abilities. We contemplate two scenarios. In the first one, each individual worker knows only her own type, while in the second scenario each worker also knows the abilities of all other workers. Our general conclusion is that the adverse selection problem can be solved in our context. However, the range of satisfactory reward schemes depends on the informational framework. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Incentives, adverse selection, strategy-proofness, reward schemes, labour-managed firms nationallicence JEL classification: D82, J54, D20 nationallicence Barberà Salvador Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: salvador.barbera@uab.es), ES aut Dutta Bhaskar Indian Statistical Institute, 7 SJS Sansanwal Maarg, New Delhi 110016, India (e-mail: dutta@isid.ac.in), IN aut https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000015 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000015 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Barberà Salvador Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: salvador.barbera@uab.es), ES aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Dutta Bhaskar Indian Statistical Institute, 7 SJS Sansanwal Maarg, New Delhi 110016, India (e-mail: dutta@isid.ac.in), IN aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer