caa a22 4500 475739671 CHVBK 20180406123456.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s100580000018 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s100580000018 Buyers' and sellers' cartels on markets with indivisible goods [Elektronische Daten] [Francis Bloch, Sayantan Ghosal] Abstract.: This paper analyzes the formation of cartels of buyers and sellers in a simple model of trade inspired by Rubinstein and Wolinsky's (1990) bargaining model. When cartels are formed only on one side of the market, there is at most one stable cartel size. When cartels are formed sequentially on the two sides of the market, there is also at most one stable cartel configuration. Under bilateral collusion, buyers and sellers form cartels of equal sizes, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers' and sellers' cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 JEL classification: C78, D43 nationallicence Key words: Bilateral collusion, buyers' and sellers' cartels, collusion in bargaining, countervailing power nationallicence Bloch Francis IRES, Department of Economics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, BE aut Ghosal Sayantan Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, GB aut https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000018 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580000018 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Bloch Francis IRES, Department of Economics, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium, BE aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ghosal Sayantan Department of Economics, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK, GB aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer