caa a22 4500 475797663 CHVBK 20180406123729.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01231490 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01231490 A hybrid equilibrium in segmented markets: the three-firm case [Elektronische Daten] [Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas, U. Cantner] In this paper, we characterize two hybrid equilibria for the three-firm case in segmented markets in which consumers not only value the product itself but also the environment within which the consumption takes place. In equilibrium, the firm with the larger population of loyal consumers chooses the monopoly price while the remaining two firms play a mixed strategy. In the duopoly case, the unique equilibrium is in mixed strategies and no firm focuses only on its loyal consumers. Springer-Verlag, 2000 segmentation nationallicence loyalty nationallicence mixed strategy nationallicence D43 nationallicence L13 nationallicence Rodríguez-Ibeas Roberto Departamento de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de La Rioja, Cigüeña, 60, E-26004, Logroño, Spain aut Cantner U. Jena, Germany aut Journal of Economics Springer-Verlag 72/1(2000-02-01), 81-97 0931-8658 72:1<81 2000 72 712 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01231490 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01231490 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Rodríguez-Ibeas Roberto Departamento de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de La Rioja, Cigüeña, 60, E-26004, Logroño, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Cantner U. Jena, Germany aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Economics Springer-Verlag 72/1(2000-02-01), 81-97 0931-8658 72:1<81 2000 72 712 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer