caa a22 4500 475797965 CHVBK 20180406123729.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000601xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/BF01227449 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/BF01227449 Nti Kofi Smeal College of Business Administration, The Pennsylvania State University, 16802, University Park, PA, USA aut Potential competition and coordination in a market-entry game [Elektronische Daten] [Kofi Nti] When there are too many potential competitors available to exploit a new market opportunity, the risk of multiple entry may discourage entry. This paper employs a contest to coordinate entry and compares the outcome with the mixed-strategy approach. Expected profit per firm decreases with potential competition and welfare eventually decreases with potential competition for many contest designs. The contest outcome is welfare superior to the mixed-strategy outcome when entry costs are high but the situation is reversed when entry costs are low. The contest model is consistent with certain empirical evidence on investment rivalry. Springer-Verlag, 2000 entry coordination nationallicence investment rivalry nationallicence potential competition nationallicence D43 nationallicence D72 nationallicence L13 nationallicence Journal of Economics Springer-Verlag 71/2(2000-06-01), 149-165 0931-8658 71:2<149 2000 71 712 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227449 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01227449 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Nti Kofi Smeal College of Business Administration, The Pennsylvania State University, 16802, University Park, PA, USA aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Journal of Economics Springer-Verlag 71/2(2000-06-01), 149-165 0931-8658 71:2<149 2000 71 712 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer