caa a22 4500 475814282 CHVBK 20180406123805.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820050008 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820050008 Cumbersome coordination in repeated games [Elektronische Daten] [Horst Raff, David Schmidt] Abstract.: This paper examines the role communication between players might serve in enabling them to reach an agreement on the future play of a repeated game. The property of the communication process that we focus on is the amount of time it takes to complete. We characterize the effects of such communication processes indirectly by determining the set of agreements they may yield. A weak and a strong criterion are introduced to describe sets of agreements that are "stable” in the sense that players would follow the current agreement and not seek to reach a new agreement. We show that as players become extremely patient, strongly stable sets converge to Pareto efficient singletons. We apply the stability criteria to Prisoner's Dilemmas and show how the unique strongly stable set reflects asymmetries in the players' stage-game payoffs. Finally, we model the communication process as a Rubinstein alternating-offer bargaining game and demonstrate that the resulting agreements help characterize the strongly stable set for a general class of communication mechanisms. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Repeated games, coordination, renegotiation, Rubinstein bargaining nationallicence Raff Horst Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA (e-mail: hraff@indiana.edu; drschmid@indiana.edu), US aut Schmidt David Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA (e-mail: hraff@indiana.edu; drschmid@indiana.edu), US aut https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050008 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820050008 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Raff Horst Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA (e-mail: hraff@indiana.edu; drschmid@indiana.edu), US aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Schmidt David Department of Economics, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405, USA (e-mail: hraff@indiana.edu; drschmid@indiana.edu), US aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer