caa a22 4500 475814339 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001829900024 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001829900024 Bac Mehmet Bilkent University, Department of Economics, Bilkent, Ankara, 06533 Turkey (e-mail: bac@bilkent.edu.tr), TR aut A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power [Elektronische Daten] [Mehmet Bac] Abstract.: Strategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong” type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Alternating offers bargaining, incomplete information, sequential equilibrium, delay nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001829900024 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001829900024 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Bac Mehmet Bilkent University, Department of Economics, Bilkent, Ankara, 06533 Turkey (e-mail: bac@bilkent.edu.tr), TR aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer