caa a22 4500 475814428 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000048 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000048 Stefanescu Anton University of Bucharest, Faculty of Mathematics, 14 Academiei st, Bucharest 70109 (e-mail: anton@pro.math.unibuc.ro), RO aut Predicting stable configurations of coalitions in cooperative games and exchange economies [Elektronische Daten] [Anton Stefanescu] Abstract.: Uniform competitive solutions are stable configurations of proposals predicting coalition formation and effective payoffs. Such "solutions” exist for almost all properly defined cooperative games and, therefore, can be proposed as substitute of the core. The new existence results obtained in the present paper concern also the case when the coalitional function of a game has empty values. All concepts and results are implemented in the competitive analysis of the exchange economies. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: cooperative games, core, competitive solutions, exchange economies nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000048 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000048 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Stefanescu Anton University of Bucharest, Faculty of Mathematics, 14 Academiei st, Bucharest 70109 (e-mail: anton@pro.math.unibuc.ro), RO aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer