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   <subfield code="a">Two-person repeated games with finite automata</subfield>
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   <subfield code="c">[Abraham Neyman, Daijiro Okada]</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Abstract.: We study two-person repeated games in which a player with a restricted set of strategies plays against an unrestricted player. An exogenously given bound on the complexity of strategies, which is measured by the size of the smallest automata that implement them, gives rise to a restriction on strategies available to a player.  We examine the asymptotic behavior of the set of equilibrium payoffs as the bound on the strategic complexity of the restricted player tends to infinity, but sufficiently slowly. Results from the study of zero sum case provide the individually rational payoff levels.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">JEL classification: C73, C72</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Key words: repeated games, finite automata</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Neyman</subfield>
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   <subfield code="u">Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904, ISRAEL and SUNY at Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY 11794-4384, USA (email: aneyman@math.huji.ac.il), IL</subfield>
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