caa a22 4500 475814444 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000049 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000049 Rodriguez Gustavo E. Wagner College, Staten Island, New York 10301, USA (e-mail: rodrigus@attglobal.net), US aut First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness [Elektronische Daten] [Gustavo E. Rodriguez] Abstract.: I study monotonicity and uniqueness of the equilibrium strategies in a two-person first price auction with affiliated signals. Existing results establish uniqueness within the class of non-decreasing bidding strategies. I show that there is an effectively unique Nash equilibrium within the class of piecewise monotone strategies. The main result is that in equilibrium, the strategies must be strictly increasing within the support of winning bids. This result provides the missing link for the analysis of uniqueness in two-person first price auctions. The analysis applies to asymmetric environments as well and does not require risk neutrality. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D44 nationallicence Key words: auctions, monotonicity, uniqueness nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000049 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000049 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Rodriguez Gustavo E. Wagner College, Staten Island, New York 10301, USA (e-mail: rodrigus@attglobal.net), US aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer