caa a22 4500 475814460 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000046 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000046 Ohseto Shinji Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan (e-mail: ohseto@bcomp.metro-u.ac.jp), JP aut Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains [Elektronische Daten] [Shinji Ohseto] Abstract.: We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Strategy-proofness, efficiency, domain restriction nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000046 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000046 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Ohseto Shinji Faculty of Economics, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Hachioji, Tokyo 192-0397, Japan (e-mail: ohseto@bcomp.metro-u.ac.jp), JP aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer