caa a22 4500 475814487 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001101xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000045 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000045 Sequence of opponents and reduced strategies [Elektronische Daten] [Jean-Pierre Beaud, Sylvain Sorin] Abstract.: We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence of short-lived uninformed players. We show: 1) that situation b) is always (weakly) better than a), 2) that it can be strictly better in some cases, 3) that the two cases are equivalent if the long uninformed player has an optimal strategy independent of his own moves. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: incomplete information, sequence of opponents nationallicence Beaud Jean-Pierre Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France 〈e-mail: beaud@poly.polytechnique.fr〉, FR aut Sorin Sylvain Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France 〈e-mail: beaud@poly.polytechnique.fr〉, FR aut https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000045 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000045 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Beaud Jean-Pierre Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France 〈e-mail: beaud@poly.polytechnique.fr〉, FR aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sorin Sylvain Laboratoire d'Econométrie, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France 〈e-mail: beaud@poly.polytechnique.fr〉, FR aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer