caa a22 4500 475814541 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000033 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000033 Pauzner Ady Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (e-mail: pauzner@post.tau.ac.il), IL aut Independent mistakes in large games [Elektronische Daten] [Ady Pauzner] Abstract.: Economic models usually assume that agents play precise best responses to others' actions. It is sometimes argued that this is a good approximation when there are many agents in the game, because if their mistakes are independent, aggregate uncertainty is small. We study a class of games in which players' payoffs depend solely on their individual actions and on the aggregate of all players' actions. We investigate whether their equilibria are affected by mistakes when the number of players becomes large. Indeed, in generic games with continuous payoff functions, independent mistakes wash out in the limit. This may not be the case if payoffs are discontinuous. As a counter-example we present the n players Nash bargaining game, as well as a large class of "free-rider games.” Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Large games nationallicence independent mistakes nationallicence trembles nationallicence free rider nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000033 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000033 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Pauzner Ady Eitan Berglas School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel (e-mail: pauzner@post.tau.ac.il), IL aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer