caa a22 4500 47581455X CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820070001 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820070001 Stennek Johan The Research Institute for Industrial Economics and CEPR, Box 5501, S-114 85 Stockholm, Sweden (e-mail: johans@iui.se), SE aut The survival value of assuming others to be rational [Elektronische Daten] [Johan Stennek] Abstract.: I study the evolution of rationality, using an indirect evolutionary approach, in which nature selects a decision-making procedure, and the procedure chooses actions in matching-games. The main result is that in order for (knowledge of) rationality to survive, it is necessary and sufficient that the rational procedure respects the attraction principle. That is, when a rational agent eliminates a strictly dominated action A, he should only increase the choice probability of the actions actually dominating A and not change the choice probability of other undominated actions. The attraction principle sharpens gametheoretic predictions. Attraction effects have been verified in psychological experiments. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Evolutionary psychology nationallicence rationality nationallicence beliefs nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820070001 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820070001 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Stennek Johan The Research Institute for Industrial Economics and CEPR, Box 5501, S-114 85 Stockholm, Sweden (e-mail: johans@iui.se), SE aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer