caa a22 4500 475814576 CHVBK 20180406123806.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1007/s001820000037 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1007/s001820000037 Wang Ruqu Economics Department, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada (e-mail: wangr@qed.econ.queensu.ca), CA aut Separating equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty [Elektronische Daten] [Ruqu Wang] Abstract.: In this paper, we analyze the class of all smooth separating sequential equilibria in a continuous-time bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty. Trade between players occurs whenever there is surplus to be shared and delay is used to signal their valuations. When the buyer and the seller have a common discount rate, we show that the final outcome is unique among all these equilibria: the difference between the highest possible buyer's valuation and the lowest possible seller's valuation always narrows down at a rate exactly equal to the discount rate. When their discount rates differ, the more patient side always reveals his valuation first in the unique smooth separating equilibrium. Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2000 Key words: Bargaining nationallicence signaling nationallicence delay nationallicence two-sided uncertainty nationallicence https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000037 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000037 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Wang Ruqu Economics Department, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6, Canada (e-mail: wangr@qed.econ.queensu.ca), CA aut Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer