caa a22 4500 475840216 CHVBK 20180406123859.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005189715272 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005189715272 Petchey Jeffrey School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U 1987, Perth, Western Australia, Australia aut Political Competition and Voter Mobility [Elektronische Daten] [Jeffrey Petchey] The existing model of political competition is extended to allow voters to live in different regions and to migrate between regions in response to an inter-regional transfer policy. We then show that regions have a different 's'sweight'' in the expected vote function of political parties. This gives parties an incentive to bias the transfer policy in favour of relatively high weight regions, with potentially adverse efficiency and equity effects. However, we then show that parties always propose efficient and equitable regional transfers, regardless of whether regions have different weights, if there is some mobility of citizens across regions. Mobility constrains parties to act efficiently and equitably even though they face an incentive to act otherwise. However, when voters are immobile political competition leads to inequitable though efficient outcomes. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 231-243 0048-5829 105:3-4<231 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005189715272 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005189715272 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Petchey Jeffrey School of Economics and Finance, Curtin University of Technology, GPO Box U 1987, Perth, Western Australia, Australia aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 231-243 0048-5829 105:3-4<231 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer