caa a22 4500 475840224 CHVBK 20180406123859.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005166715632 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005166715632 Bribery and Public Debt Repudiation [Elektronische Daten] [Debora Di Gioacchino, Sergio Ginebri, Laura Sabani] In cases where policy makers accept 's'sbribes'' offered by organised lobbies or interestedparties, government decisions can be modelled as a first price menu auction. In this paper we adaptthis structure to model debt repudiation. We considera one-period model in which two generations, parents and children, are present, and debt titles are unevenlydistributed among parents. The government can repaythe debt by a combination of taxes on the children'sincome and on the outstanding debt. We excludeintergenerational conflicts, assuming that the parents'and children's objective is to maximise the utility ofthe family. In this perspective, families make offersthat relate monetary contributions to the taxstructures chosen by the government. On the hypothesisthat all interests are represented, we obtain theresult that the government is indifferent to the taxstructure. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Di Gioacchino Debora Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut Ginebri Sergio Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut Sabani Laura Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 303-321 0048-5829 105:3-4<303 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005166715632 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005166715632 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Di Gioacchino Debora Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Ginebri Sergio Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sabani Laura Dipartimento di Economia Pubblica, Università La Sapienza di Roma, Via Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 303-321 0048-5829 105:3-4<303 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer