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   <subfield code="a">Mueller on European Federation: A Reply from the Perspective of Australian Federalism</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Dennis Mueller has recently made a significant contribution tounderstanding issues of federalism and confederalism in theEuropean Union - from a particular public choice point of view. Hefurnishes an important and provocative discussion of therelationship between the decision-making rules embodied in aconstitutional convention (or other means of drafting a form ofunion for constituent states) and the decision-making rules whichwill be contained in the constitution which is the outcome of thatconvention. However, Mueller's veiled preference for a certainideal form of federalism for Europe tends to reduce the parametersof his discussion, and gives his article an unrealistic and narrowfocus, despite its ambitious scope. The present article exploressome of the latent complexities in the public choice analysis anddesign of European integration, particularly by drawing on thewider experience of working federations and theory of federalism,using the unique and synthesizing Australian experience as a pointof departure. It argues that Mueller's analysis is biased towardsthe reduction of decision-making costs of European governance, andthus undervalues the external costs that may be imposed throughexcessive central government.</subfield>
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