caa a22 4500 475840267 CHVBK 20191127072029.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005140329575 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005140329575 Lippi Francesco Research Department, Banca d'Italia, via Nazionale 91, 00184, Rome, Italy aut Median Voter Preferences, Central Bank Independence and Conservatism [Elektronische Daten] [Francesco Lippi] This paper studies how the independence and theconservatism of a central bank relate to the structureand stability of the median voter preferences. This isdone by means of a model of endogenous delegationwhere an opportunistic policy maker chooses themonetary regime (independence and conservatism) tomaximise the welfare of the median voter. The resultsshow that a high degree of inflation aversion ofmonetary policy is not necessarily associated with ahigh degree of central bank independence. A high andstable degree of inflation aversion of society (i.e.of the median voter) may lead to establish a dependentcentral bank which is highly inflation averse. This suggests that the negativecorrelation between inflation and central bankindependence indices detected by several empiricalstudies may reflect a link between inflation and somedeep features of social preferences. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 323-338 0048-5829 105:3-4<323 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005140329575 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005140329575 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Lippi Francesco Research Department, Banca d'Italia, via Nazionale 91, 00184, Rome, Italy aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 323-338 0048-5829 105:3-4<323 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence SWISSBIB 077012011 BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer