caa a22 4500 47584033X CHVBK 20180406123859.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001201xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005271023086 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005271023086 Palda Filip École nationale d'administration publique, 4750, ave. Henri-Julien, H2T 3E5, Montreal, Quebec aut Improper Selection of High-Cost Producers in the Rent-Seeking Contest [Elektronische Daten] [Filip Palda] The resources two rival businesses spend to raise their own chanceof getting a unique monopoly license are a cost of rent-seeking.When those businesses differ in the costs of producing themonopoly good there is an additional cost of rent-seeking that hasnot been sufficiently studied in the literature. If the high cost producer winsthe license, the difference between his cost and the costs of hismore efficient rival is a social loss from improper selection ofproducers by the political process. The loss becomes more severewhen the ability to lobby of the inefficient producer outstripsthat of the efficient producer. This may help to explain whyspecialized lobbying evolved. Specialized lobbying reduces thesocial cost from improper selection of firms by allowing efficientproducers to hire expert rent-seekers and so to raise theirchances of gaining monopoly concessions. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 291-301 0048-5829 105:3-4<291 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005271023086 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005271023086 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Palda Filip École nationale d'administration publique, 4750, ave. Henri-Julien, H2T 3E5, Montreal, Quebec aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/3-4(2000-12-01), 291-301 0048-5829 105:3-4<291 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer