caa a22 4500 475840372 CHVBK 20180406123900.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005258810057 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005258810057 Berganza Juan Vía de las dos Castillas, 7, 28224 Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain aut Two Roles for Elections: Disciplining the Incumbent and Selecting a Competent Candidate [Elektronische Daten] [Juan Berganza] This paper presents a political economy model in which the voterswant to control moral hazard on the part of the incumbent andselect a competent candidate to be in office. We focus on electionswhich take place repeatedly as the basic disciplinary and screeningmechanism. It is shown that incomplete information of the votersabout the (economic) competence of the incumbent helps to overcomethe lame duck effect of a government with foreseeable end. Asecond finding is that economic performance strongly influences thereelection of the incumbent. In particular, in (stationary perfectBayesian) equilibrium, if economic performance is bad, theincumbent will not be reelected. We also prove that having thepossibility of reelecting a government increases the welfare of thevoters to the no reelection benchmark. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/1-2(2000-10-01), 165-194 0048-5829 105:1-2<165 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005258810057 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005258810057 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Berganza Juan Vía de las dos Castillas, 7, 28224 Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid, Spain aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/1-2(2000-10-01), 165-194 0048-5829 105:1-2<165 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer