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   <subfield code="a">We analyze the welfare gains from the reform of existinggovernment-induced distortions. Our results provide support forpolicies aimed at eliminating monopoly and other types of economicdistortion. Welfare gains over the status quo exist wheneverderegulation occurs. The threat of deregulation can induce amonopoly or cartel to modify its behavior, so a reform policy canprove beneficial even if reform does not actually occur. Optimalpolicy with commitment in fact allows a monopoly to deterderegulation. The possibility of reregulation does not reverse ourresults; the per period welfare gain from reform remainsundiminished.</subfield>
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