caa a22 4500 475840429 CHVBK 20180406123900.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20001001xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005105822911 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005105822911 Corruption, Tax Evasion and the Laffer Curve [Elektronische Daten] [Amal Sanyal, Ira Gang, Omkar Goswami] In a corrupt tax administration a rise in tax ratesets off complicated strategic moves by both taxpayersand administrators. It is shown that in somecircumstances, this may bring about Laffer likebehavior of overall tax revenue, i.e. a higher taxrate results in smaller net revenue for thegovernment. Further, a more intense tax effort byincreasing the number of returns audited may alsoreduce net revenues. Finally if tax and fine ratespositively influence the level of corruption in theadministration, these outcomes become more likely. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Sanyal Amal Department of Economics and Marketing, Lincoln University, New Zealand aut Gang Ira Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, U.S.A. aut Goswami Omkar Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, India aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/1-2(2000-10-01), 61-78 0048-5829 105:1-2<61 2000 105 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005105822911 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005105822911 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Sanyal Amal Department of Economics and Marketing, Lincoln University, New Zealand aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Gang Ira Department of Economics, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Goswami Omkar Confederation of Indian Industry, New Delhi, India aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 105/1-2(2000-10-01), 61-78 0048-5829 105:1-2<61 2000 105 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer