<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">475840496</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180406123900.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170329e20000901xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1023/A:1005161821085</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005161821085</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="100" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Eusepi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Giuseppe</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Roma 's'sLa Sapienza'', Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="1" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Contractual Fiscal Equivalence Versus Geographical Fiscal Equivalence</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Giuseppe Eusepi]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">This work extends the contractual procedure, normally used in therelationships among persons, to intergovernmental relationshipsnamely those among local jurisdictions. This changing inperspective challenges the efficiency criterion based ongeographical fiscal equivalence; in fact the level of equilibriumdoes not depend on the level of the public good provided perse; it rather depends on the fiscal system, on the position ofthe median voter, on whether interjurisdictional mobility iseither favoured or forbidden, and finally on whether the centralgovernment uses transfers either for redistributive purposes oras payments of the services provided by local jurisdictions. Inparticular, the paper shows that if two jurisdictions of the samelevel are allowed to have contractual relationships (horizontalrelationships) the more efficient of the two can sell the servicealso to the less efficient, so reducing citizens' unit costs.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Kluwer Academic Publishers</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">104/3-4(2000-09-01), 309-317</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">104:3-4&lt;309</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2000</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">104</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005161821085</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005161821085</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">100</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Eusepi</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Giuseppe</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">Facoltà di Economia, Università degli Studi di Roma 's'sLa Sapienza'', Via del Castro Laurenziano 9, 00161, Roma, Italy</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Kluwer Academic Publishers</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">104/3-4(2000-09-01), 309-317</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">104:3-4&lt;309</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2000</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">104</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
