caa a22 4500 475840631 CHVBK 20180406123900.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000901xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005116413195 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005116413195 The Status of the Budget Constraint, Federalism and the Relative Size of Government: A Bureaucracy Approach [Elektronische Daten] [Wim Moesen, Philippe van Cauwenberge] We develop a model along the lines of Niskanen,articulating that under a soft government budgetconstraint the full production cost of the public goodis not reflected in the tax price as perceived by theconsumer-taxpayer-voter. Various proportions ofnon-tax financing and different degrees of votermyopia with respect to discounting the future taxliabilities are taken into account. It can be shownthat both the actual level of public output and theamount of slack resources are lower under a hardbudget constraint than under a soft budget regime.Lower levels of government typically operate under ahard budget constraint when compared with the federallevel since they have only limited (public) borrowingopportunities and no access to money creation(seignorage). In a federalist setting more governmentdecisions are taken under a hard budget constraintthan in a unitary state. Hence one would expect thatthe overall size of government is relatively smallerin a structure with fiscal federalism. An empiricaltest for 19 OECD-countries (1990-1992) seems tosupport this hypothesis. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Moesen Wim Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut van Cauwenberge Philippe Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/3-4(2000-09-01), 207-224 0048-5829 104:3-4<207 2000 104 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005116413195 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005116413195 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- Moesen Wim Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut NATIONALLICENCE 700 1- van Cauwenberge Philippe Center for Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Sabbelaan 53, 8500, Kortrijk, Belgium aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/3-4(2000-09-01), 207-224 0048-5829 104:3-4<207 2000 104 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer