<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<collection xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim">
 <record>
  <leader>     caa a22        4500</leader>
  <controlfield tag="001">475840666</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="003">CHVBK</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="005">20180406123900.0</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="007">cr unu---uuuuu</controlfield>
  <controlfield tag="008">170329e20000701xx      s     000 0 eng  </controlfield>
  <datafield tag="024" ind1="7" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">10.1023/A:1005139726166</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">doi</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="035" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">(NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005139726166</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="245" ind1="0" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="a">Show Them Your Teeth First!</subfield>
   <subfield code="h">[Elektronische Daten]</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">[Randolph Sloof, Frans van Winden]</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="520" ind1="3" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">This paper investigates the choice of an interestgroup between lobbying ('s'swords'') and pressure('s'sactions'') in order to influence a policymaker. Both lobbying and pressure are modeled asstrategic means of transmitting information that isrelevant to the policymaker. However, only pressure isdirectly costly to the policymaker. The interactionbetween the interest group and the policymaker isframed as a repeated signaling game. In equilibriumpressure - in contrast to lobbying - only occurswhen the interest group's reputation is sufficientlylow, and always improves its reputation. It is shownthat (repeated) lobbying cannot completely substitutefor pressure, and that the interest group may beforced to sustain its reputation through lobbying. Weconclude that pressure is typically used to build upa reputation, lobbying to maintain a reputation.</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="540" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">Sloof</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Randolph</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">NWO Priority Programme 'sScholar', Faculty of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, the Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">van Winden</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Frans</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">CREED and the Tinbergen Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="773" ind1="0" ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Kluwer Academic Publishers</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">104/1-2(2000-07-01), 81-120</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">104:1-2&lt;81</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2000</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">104</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0">
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005139726166</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="908" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="D">1</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">research-article</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">jats</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">856</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">40</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005139726166</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">text/html</subfield>
   <subfield code="z">Onlinezugriff via DOI</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">Sloof</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Randolph</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">NWO Priority Programme 'sScholar', Faculty of Economics, University of Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB, Amsterdam, the Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">700</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">1-</subfield>
   <subfield code="a">van Winden</subfield>
   <subfield code="D">Frans</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">CREED and the Tinbergen Institute, Faculty of Economics, University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands</subfield>
   <subfield code="4">aut</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="950" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="P">773</subfield>
   <subfield code="E">0-</subfield>
   <subfield code="t">Public Choice</subfield>
   <subfield code="d">Kluwer Academic Publishers</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">104/1-2(2000-07-01), 81-120</subfield>
   <subfield code="x">0048-5829</subfield>
   <subfield code="q">104:1-2&lt;81</subfield>
   <subfield code="1">2000</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">104</subfield>
   <subfield code="o">11127</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="900" ind1=" " ind2="7">
   <subfield code="a">Metadata rights reserved</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">Springer special CC-BY-NC licence</subfield>
   <subfield code="2">nationallicence</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="898" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="a">BK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">XK010053</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">XK010000</subfield>
  </datafield>
  <datafield tag="949" ind1=" " ind2=" ">
   <subfield code="B">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="F">NATIONALLICENCE</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">NL-springer</subfield>
  </datafield>
 </record>
</collection>
