caa a22 4500 475840690 CHVBK 20180406123900.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005054731693 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005054731693 Sutter Matthias Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria aut Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU [Elektronische Daten] [Matthias Sutter] This paper studies the implications offlexible integration in the European Union. Itanalyses the voting power of member states in theCouncil of Ministers when differently sized subgroupsof the EU are set up. European Monetary Union isreferred to as the most important example of flexibleintegration. The Banzhaf-Index is calculated to studythe distribution of voting power in the decisionmaking process according to the stability and growthpact. The results show considerable fluctuations,especially for smaller countries, in relative votingpower, the latter being defined as the relationbetween voting power and relative voting weight. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/1-2(2000-07-01), 41-62 0048-5829 104:1-2<41 2000 104 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005054731693 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005054731693 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Sutter Matthias Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, Austria aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/1-2(2000-07-01), 41-62 0048-5829 104:1-2<41 2000 104 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer