caa a22 4500 475840712 CHVBK 20180406123900.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000701xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005119311685 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005119311685 Baker Samuel Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, VA 23187, Williamsburg, U.S.A. aut Does Enhanced Veto Authority Centralize Government? [Elektronische Daten] [Samuel Baker] Previous theoretical and empirical research findsenhanced veto authority has little systematic effecton level of spending. This paper takes a new tact,examining the effect of veto power on thecentralization of governmental services. It proposesand tests a model of federalism in which differenttypes of veto authority lead to differing degrees ofcentralization when the executive and legislature havedisparate preferences over the level of governmentthat should provide services. Empirical resultsindicate governors in the United States use enhancedveto authority to centralize state and localgovernment spending. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/1-2(2000-07-01), 63-79 0048-5829 104:1-2<63 2000 104 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005119311685 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005119311685 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Baker Samuel Department of Economics, College of William and Mary, VA 23187, Williamsburg, U.S.A aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 104/1-2(2000-07-01), 63-79 0048-5829 104:1-2<63 2000 104 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer