caa a22 4500 475840836 CHVBK 20180406123901.0 cr unu---uuuuu 170329e20000301xx s 000 0 eng 10.1023/A:1005015131088 doi (NATIONALLICENCE)springer-10.1023/A:1005015131088 Boyce John Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand aut Interest Group Competition over Policy Outcomes: Dynamics, Strategic Behavior, and Social Costs [Elektronische Daten] [John Boyce] This paper analyzes a two-period model of interestgroup competition between two groups to affect thepolicy outcome. The paper characterizes the subgameperfect equilibrium and considers the welfareimplications of the model. The subgame perfectequilibrium to this game is allocatively efficient ifand only if the initial equilibrium is allocativelyefficient and interest groups are equally adept atproducing political pressure. When rent seeking isconstitutionally protected, the notion of rent-seekingconstrained efficiency is defined as the cooperativesolution to the rent-seeking game. It is shown that arent-seeking constrained efficient equilibrium isattainable by forcing winners in political competitionto fully compensate losers. Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000 Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 102/3-4(2000-03-01), 313-339 0048-5829 102:3-4<313 2000 102 11127 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005015131088 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI 1 research-article jats NATIONALLICENCE 856 40 https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005015131088 text/html Onlinezugriff via DOI NATIONALLICENCE 100 1- Boyce John Department of Economics, University of Auckland, Private Bag 92019, Auckland, New Zealand aut NATIONALLICENCE 773 0- Public Choice Kluwer Academic Publishers 102/3-4(2000-03-01), 313-339 0048-5829 102:3-4<313 2000 102 11127 Metadata rights reserved Springer special CC-BY-NC licence nationallicence BK010053 XK010053 XK010000 NATIONALLICENCE NATIONALLICENCE NL-springer